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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Indian Springs LLC (hereinafter "Indian Springs") rightfully foreclosed upon real 
propeliy and obtained title thereto. The foreclosure and Indian Springs' title to the real propeliy 
were affirmed in Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 
215 P.3d 457 (2009). 
Subsequently, Indian Springs filed a lawsuit to eject the Andersens from a mobile home 
located thereon. The Andersens argued that the ejectment was improper. Alternatively, they 
argued that they should be permitted to remove the mobile home or be reimbursed for its value. 
They also asserted a counterclaim for reimbursement relating to improvements allegedly made to 
the property prior to the foreclosure and/or ejectment. 
On December 15, 2009, the district cOUli entered a Memorandum Decision and Order, 
holding that Indian Springs was entitled to ejectment, that Indian Springs held title to the mobile 
home because it was affixed to the property, and that the Andersens had no right to remove the 
mobile home or to receive reimbursement for its value. On November 2, 2010, the district cOUli 
entered a Memorandum Decision and Order, dismissing the Andersens' counterclaim for 
improvements allegedly made to the property. The Andersens now appeal. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 2, 1996, D.M. and Shirley Thornhill entered into an agreement to sell real 
property known as Indian Springs Natatorium (hereinafter "the Real Propeliy") to Terry and 
Rosanna Andersen (the Andersens) and John and Julie Baker (the Bakers), d/b/a Recreational 
5 
Properties A&B, a partnership, for a sum of $750,000. 1 A down payment of $100,000 was made 
and Terry Andersen and John Baker signed a promissory note for the remaining amount.2 They 
also signed a real estate mortgage on the Real Property to secure the note.3 Because of sporadic 
payments under the promissory note, the Thornhills declared default on February 24, 2005, and 
demanded payment in full under the note.4 The Thornhills subsequently assigned their interest in 
the note and m01igage to Indian Springs.5 
On October 21, 2005, Indian Springs filed a Complaint against numerous defendants, 
including the Andersens and the Bakers, to collect on the promissory note and to foreclose on the 
mortgage (hereinafter "the 2005 Lawsuit,,).6 On November 19,2007, the district court entered a 
summary judgment decision quieting title to the Real Property in Indian Springs and awarding 
damages against the /\ndersens and the Bakers in the amount of $270,637.50 plus interest, along 
with tax payments of $20,582.46.7 The district court's summary judgment decision was affirmed 
on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 8 
1 Indian SjJrings LLC, 147 Idaho at 741, 215 P.3d at 461. 
2 Id. 
3 Id 
4 Id. at 742,215 P.3d at 462. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 743, 215 P.3d at 463. 
8 !d. at 746-49, 215 P.3d at 466-69. 
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Despite the fact that title had been quieted in Indian Springs, the Andersens continued to 
unlawfully possess a mobile home located on the Real Property.9 The mobile home was 
permanently attached to the land, was on a permanent foundation, and could not be moved. lo 
III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On March 3, 2009, Indian Springs filed a Complaint, seeking to evict the Andersens 
under I.C. § 6-310. 11 The Andersens filed a pro se Answer and Counterclail11. 12 The Answer 
and Counterclaim generally denied the allegations in the Complaint, sought to re-1itigate the 
prior foreclosure action, and claimed reimbursement for certain improvements allegedly made by 
the Andersens to the Real Property. 13 
On October 8, 2009, this matter proceeded to trial where the Andersens represented 
themselves. 14 A number of witnesses testified. The testimony revealed that the mobile horne 
9 On page 4 of the Appellants' Brief, the Andersens claim that the property immediately around 
the mobile horne was "included in enol' [in the mortgage] by the same attomey who created the 
confusion of title." On page 5, they contradict themselves by admitting that they "were able to 
mortgage the home." Notwithstanding, any claimed enor in the mortgage is unsuppOlied by any 
evidence in the record on appeal. Moreover, any claims based upon enol'S in the mortgage 
should have been raised in the 2005 Litigation and are now precluded by the doctrine of res 
judicata as argued below. 
10 R. at 36, 183-85, 194. 
II R. at 183. 
12R. at 29. 
13 R. at 29-32,35-36,38-39. 
14 R. at 151-152. It should be noted that the Andersens have failed to obtain a transcript of the 
trial for purposes of their appeal of this matter. Therefore, all references to the testimony elicited 
at trial is from the district comi's subsequent Memorandum Decision and Order. See R. at 182. 
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could not be moved because it was on a permanent foundation. 1s At the conclusion of trial, the 
Andersens were granted additional time to provide legal authority as to whether the mobile home 
fi 16 had become a permanent lxture. 
On November 2, 2009, Indian Springs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Pleadings, 
seeking to amend its Complaint by adding a verification and correcting an attached exhibit. 17 The 
requested amendment did not alter any of the substantive allegations or causes of action. On 
November 17, 2009, the district court granted the motion. ls 
On November 20, 2009, the Andersens filed a pro se Amended Motion to Dismiss, 
arguing that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it sought eviction under I.e. § 
6-310, which the Andersens contended did not apply under the circumstances of this case. J 9 A 
hearing was held with regard to the Andersens' Amended Motion to Dismiss.2o At the hearing, 
Indian Springs made an oral motion pursuant to LR.C.P. 15(b) to add a claim for ejectment to 
conform the Amended Complaint to the evidence presented at trial.21 The Andersens objected. 
The district court indicated that the Andersens' Amended Motion to Dismiss and Indian Springs 
Rule 15(b) Motion would be taken under advisement.22 
15 R. at 185. 
16 R. a1152. 
17 R. at 111-42 & 143-44. 
18 R. 153-54. 
19 R. at 156-58. 




On December 15, 2009, the district cOUli issued its Memorandum Decision and Order.23 
First, the district court dismissed Indian Springs' claim for eviction under I.e. § 6-310 and 
granted Indian Springs' Rule 15(b) motion to add a claim for ejectment.24 Second, the district 
court reaffirmed that Indian Springs held title to the real propeliy and that Indian Springs was 
entitled 10 eject the Andersens from the property.25 Third, the district court addressed the 
Andersens' claim to the mobile home located on the real property and held that the mobile home 
was real property (rather than personal propeliy) based upon trial testimony that the mobile home 
was "permanently attached to the land and cannot be moved" and had, among other things, "a 
garage, storage room, patio walls and a cement £1001'.,,26 The district court noted in its decision: 
"At no time have Defendants claimed that the mobile [home] was anything but permanently 
affixed to the real property.,,27 Based upon its finding that the mobile home was real propeliy, 
the district court held that the Andersens had no right to remove the mobile home from the Real 
Property and must surrender it along with the Real Propeliy to Indian Springs.28 Lastly, the 
district court directed the Andersens to remove all personal propeliy from mobile home within 
120 days of the district court's decision?9 
23 R. at 182-97. 
24 R. at 191-93. 
25 R. at 193. 
26 R. at 194. 
27 Id. 
28 R. at 194-95. 
29 R. at 195. 
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Desiring to immediately appeal, the Andersens filed a pro se Motion for a Rule 54(b) 
Certificate.3o On March 11,2010, a hearing was held.3 ! At the hearing, the Andersens advised 
the district comi that they had not yet removed their personal property from the mobile home.32 
The district court instructed the Andersens to "diligently move forward with Defendants 
. h . I . ,,33 recovenng t eu persona property. On March 31,2010, the district court entered its 
Memorandum Decision and Order denying the Andersens' Motion for a Rule 54(b) Certificate.34 
On April 12, 2010, the district court entered an Order granting the Andersens until June 
15, 2010, to remove their personal property from the mobile home and an adj acent shed.35 
On May 24,2010, the Andersens filed apro se Motion for Reconsideration. On June 10, 
2010, a hearing was held.36 The district court indicated that it would take the motion under 
advisement.37 Upon the Andersens' request, the district court granted them additional time to 
remove their personal property from the mobile home.38 
On July 1, 2010, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order, denying 
the Andersens' Motion for Reconsideration.39 The district court denied the motion because the 




34 R. at 200-03. 
35 R. at 206. 
36 R. at 241-42. 
37 Id. 
38 R. at 242. 
39 R. at 244-47. 
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Andersens "provide[ d] no case law or additional facts that support their position or cause this 
Court to consider changing its prior decision regarding the issue of whether the mobile home is 
I ,,40 persona property. 
On July 8, 2010, the Andersens with the assistance of legal counsel filed an Answer to 
the Amended Complaint and Counterclaim.4! On August 9,2010, Indian Springs filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Andersens' Counterclaim.42 On October 7, 2010, a hearing was held on these 
motions and the district court took the matter under advisement.43 
On November 2, 2010, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order, 
granting in part Indian Springs' Motion to Dismiss.44 The district court applied a summary 
judgment standard to the Motion to Dismiss because "substantial matters [had] been submitted 
outside the pleadings.,,45 Upon applying the summary judgment standard, the district court 
dismissed all of the Andersens' counterclaims, except for their counterclaim seeking 
reimbursement for certain utility payments.46 The district court also ordered the Andersens to 
remove their personal property from the mobile home by November 30, 2010.47 
40 R. at 246. 
41 R. at 248-62. This is the first time in this particular case that legal counsel appeared on behalf 
of the Andersens. 
42 R. at 267-68. 
43 R. at 277. 
44 R. at 279-294. 
45 R. at 283. 
46 R. at 292. 
47 R. at 291. 
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On November 30, 2010, the district court entered an Order granting the Andersens an 
additional seven (7) days to remove their personal property .48 
On December 2, 2010, the Andersens filed two Affidavits which addressed their 
remaining claim for reimbursement of certain utility payments.49 However, on December 8, 
2010, the Andersens filed a "Withdrawal of Damages Submissions" stating that they were 
withdrawing "their damages submissions, filed by affidavit on December 2, 2010 and consent to 
immediate entry of final judgment. ,,50 
On December 9, 2010, the district court entered its Judgment granting Indian Springs the 
relief sought in its Amended Complaint and dismissing with prejudice all of the Andersens' 
l · ~1 counterc aIms.-
On December 9, 2010, the Andersens filed their Notice of Appeal. 52 
On December 15, 2010, the district court entered an Order which once again granted the 
Andersens additional time to remove their personal property from the Real Propeliy.53 The 
deadline set by the district court was December 16,2010 at 4:00 p.m. 54 On December 16,2010, 
the district court entered an Order graIlting the Andersens one additional hour to remove their 
48 R. at 295-97. 
49 R. at 298-352. 
50 R. at 354-55. 
51 R. at 356-57. 
52 R. at 359-63. 
53 R. at 368-69. 
54 R. at 369. 
12 
personal property.55 The Andersens finally complied with the district court's order that they 
remove their personal property. 
55 R. at 371-72. 
13 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
It appears that the following issues have been identified and/or argued by the Andersens 
in their Appellants' Brief: 
1. Whether the district court properly granted Indian Springs' Rule 15(b) motion to 
add a claim for ejectment to conform the Amended Complaint to the evidence 
presented at trial? 
2. Whether the district court properly found that Indian Springs possessed legal title 
to the Real Property sufficient to eject the Andersens from the Real Property? 
3. Whether the district court properly found that the mobile home was real propeliy 
rather than personal property, which precluded the Andersens from removing the 
mobile home from the Real Property and precluded the Andersens claim for 
reimbursement associated with the mobile home? 
4. Whether the district court properly dismissed the Andersens' counterclaim for 
unjust enrichment which sought payment for improvements they allegedly made 
upon the Real Property prior to the foreclosure and/or ejectment? 
5. Whether the Andersens have shown the district judge was biased? 
In addition, Indian Springs identifies the following issue on appeal: Whether Indian 
Springs is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal? 
14 
A TTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Indian Springs is entitled to an award of attomey fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. 
§ 12-121, LR.C.P. 54(e)(1), and LA.R. 11.2. The Andersens' pursuit of this appeal must be 
deemed unreasonable, frivolous, without merit, not well grounded, not warranted by existing 
law, and not made in good faith. 
The evidence relied upon by the district court below was undisputed, uncontrovelied and 
derived primarily from the Andersens' own testimony. The Andersens utterly failed to present 
evidence sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact. The Andersens' failed to include 
sufficient portions of the record to support their appeal. The Appellants' Brief is devoid of any 
citation to the record. The Andersens failed to cite any relevant case law to suppOli their 
arguments. The Andersens have ignored the res judicata doctrine and have simply attempted to 
litigate and/or re-litigate issues that were or should have been raised in the 2005 Litigation. The 
Andersens have ignored the clear law regarding the character of the mobile home. 
For these reasons and upon these grounds, Indian Springs respectfully requests attorney 
fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, LR.C.P. 54(e)(1), and LA.R. 11.2. 
15 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. RULE lS(B) MOTION TO AMEND PLEADINGS 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to amend the pleadings pursuant to LR.C.P. 15(b) is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Todd v. Sullivan Constr. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 126, 191 P .2d 
196, 204 (2008). "The determination whether an issue has been tried with the consent of the 
parties is within the trial couli's discretion, and such determination will only be reversed when 
that discretion has been abused." Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 483, 129 P.3d 1223, 1232 
(2006). "In reviewing an exercise of discretion, this Court must consider (1) whether the trial 
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial comi reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason." ld. 
II. MOTION TO DISMISS 
A district court's dismissal of a claim under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. 
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010). On appeal, the Court must 
determine "whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim, which if 
true, would entitle him to relief." Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618, 213 P.3d 398, 403 
(2009) (quoting Rincover v. Dep'l of Fin., 128 Idaho 653,656,917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996)). The 
Court must "draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving pmiy." Taylor v. Maile, 
142 Idaho 253,257,127 P.3d 156,160 (2005) (citation omitted). "After drawing all inferences in 
16 
favor of the non-moving party, the COUli then examines whether a claim for relief has been 
stated." Id. 
However, where a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted is suppOlied by evidence and affidavits outside the pleadings, the motion is treated as a 
motion for summary judgment. LR.C.P. 12(b); Allen v. Dep '( o.lParks & Rec., l36 Idaho 487, 
488, 36 P.3d 1275, 1276 (2001). "The standard of review on appeal from an order granting 
summary judgment is the same standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the 
summary judgment motion." Allen, l36 Idaho at 488, 36 P.3d at 1276. Summary judgment is 
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving paIiy is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P.56(c). 
"Where the case will be tried without a jury, the district cOUli, as the trier of fact, is 
entitled to draw the most probable inferences from the undisputed evidence properly before it 
and grant the summary judgment motion in spite of the potential of conflicting inferences." 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415, 418, 234 P.3d 739, 742 (2010). "This COUli 
freely reviews the entire record before the district court to determine whether either side was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and whether inferences drawn by the district court are 
reasonably supported by the record." Id. (citing Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 
285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010)). In those limited instances where "the 
evidence is entirely confined to a written record, there is no additional, in-coUli testimony to be 
obtained, and the trial judge alone will be responsible for choosing the evidentiary facts he 
17 
deems most probable," the trial judge may grant summary judgment on undisputed evidentiary 
facts, despite conflicting inferences. Id. (quoting Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670-71, 
691 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (Ct. App. 1984)). In such instances, the appropriate standard of review 
on appeal is equivalent to the standard of clear error prescribed by I.R.C.P. 52(a). Id. (citing 
Flemmer v. Tammany Elementary Sch. Dist No. 343, 116 Idaho 204, 207 n.2, 774 P.2d 914, 917 
n.2 (Ct. App. 1989)). The Court on appeal considering a district cOUli's grant of summary 
judgment in such circumstances examines the record to determine whether the trial cOUli's 
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. 
III. TRIAL COURT AS FACT-FINDER 
"The trial cOUli's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Thus, 
even if the evidence is conflicting, if the findings of fact are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, this Court will not disturb those findings on appeal." Shore v. Peterson, 
146 Idaho 903,907,204 P.3d 1114, 1118 (2009). 
IV. LACK OF ADEQUATE RECORD ON APPEAL 
"The burden is on the appellants to ensure there is an adequate record on appeal." Flying 
Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9,14 n2, 232 P.3d 330,335 n2 (2010). "[T]he appellant 
has the obligation to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her claims on appeal." 
Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 751, 215 P.3d 457, 471 
(2009). "In the absence of a record that is adequate to review the Andersens' claims, we will not 
presume error below." Id. 
18 
ARGUMENT 
The Andersens are currently representing themselves without the assistance of counsel. 
Notwithstanding, this Supreme Court adheres to the rule that persons acting pro se are held to the 
same standards and rules as those represented by attorneys. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 
117 PJd 120, 123 (200S). 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED INDIAN SPRINGS' RULE 
lS(B) MOTION TO ADD A CLAIM FOR EJECTMENT TO CONFORM THE 
AMENDED COMPLAINT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
On pages 4-S of the Appellants' Brief, the Andersens argue that the district court abused 
its discretion in granting Indian Springs' Rule IS(b) Motion to add a claim for ejectment to the 
Amended Complaint. This argument is without merit. 
Rule IS (b) provides, "When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or 
implied consent of the pmiies, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings." "The Rule also provides that a motion to amend the pleadings cml be made at any 
time, even after judgment." Todd, 146 Idaho at 126, 191 P.2d at 204. "The purpose of Rule 
IS(b) is to allow cases to be decided on the merits, rather than upon technical pleading 
requirements." Hughes, 142 Idaho at 483, 129 P.3d at 1232. If a party cannot show prejudice by 
pointing to evidence it would have otherwise introduced or arguments it would have otherwise 
made, then that party may not challenge a district court's finding based on an otherwise unpled 
theory. ld. at 484, 129 P.3d at 1233. 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to amend the pleadings pursuant to LR.C.P. lS(b) is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Todd, 146 Idaho at 121, 191 P.2d at 200. "The 
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determination whether an issue has been tried with the consent of the parties is within the trial 
court's discretion, and such determination will only be reversed when that discretion has been 
abused." Hughes, 142 Idaho at 484, 129 P.3d at 1233. "In reviewing an exercise of discretion, 
this Court must consider (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." Id. 
In granting Indian Springs' Rule 15(b) motion to add a claim for ej ectment, the district 
court conectly noted that granting a Rule 15(b) motion was within its discretion. 56 The district 
court also acted within the bounds of its discretion and exercised reason in reaching its decision. 
The district court held: 
The issue tried in this case is whether Defendants are entitled to any 
continued possession of the mobile home even after the judgment quieting title to 
the real property in Indian Springs and acquisition of a deed to the property by 
Indian Springs. The evidence bearing on that issue is the same whether the claim 
is designated as one for unlawful detainer or ej ectment. 57 
The district court also noted that the evidence presented by the Andersens in defense of this case 
was equally relevant to the initially-pled unlawful detainer claim as it was to the added ejectment 
claim. 58 In addition, the district cOUli noted that the Idaho COUli of Appeals had previously 
approved of the dismissal of an unlawful detainer claim and the grant of a Rule 15(b) motion to 
56 R. at 193. 
57 Id. 
58 R. at 192-93. 
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add an ejectment claim in materially identical circumstances as those presented in this case. See 
Nationsbanc Jv[ortgage Corp. v. Cazier, 127 Idaho 879, 881-82, 908 P.2d 575, 574-75 eeL App. 
1995). 
Furthermore, the Andersens have failed to show any prejudice by pointing to evidence 
they would have otherwise introduced or arguments they would have otherwise made. See 
Hughes, 142 Idaho at 484, 129 P.3d at 1233. Without such prejudice, the Andersens' appeal of 
the district court's grant ofIndian Spring's Rule 15(b) motion fails. Id. 
The district court acted well within the bounds of its discretion. The district court's grant 
of Indian Springs' Rule 15(b) motion should be affirmed on appeal. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT INDIAN SPRINGS 
POSSESSED TITLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY 
On page 16 of the Appellants' Brief, it appears that the Andersens are attempting to argue 
that Indian Springs had no right to foreclose upon the Real Property and/or never obtained legal 
title to the Real Propeliy. This argument is frivolous. 
The issue of foreclosure and title to the Real Property were fully litigated in the 2005 
Lawsuit, which concluded with the district comi entering a final judgment allowing foreclosure 
and quieting title to the Real Property in Indian Springs.59 The final judgment was affirmed on 
appeal. 60 
59 Indian Springs LLC, 147 Idaho at 743, 215 P.3d at 463; see also R. at 183 (fn. 2). 
60 Id. 
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Because of the finality of the judgment in the 2005 Lawsuit, the doctrine of res judicata 
precludes the Andersens from re-litigating title to the property in this present lawsuit. The 
doctrine of resjudicClta has been explained as follows: 
Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata provides that when a final judgment has 
been entered on the merits of a case, "[i]t is a finality as to the claim or demand in 
controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to 
every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or 
demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for 
that purpose." The final 'judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which 
camlot again be brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground 
whatever." 
Knox v. State, 148 Idaho 324, 338, 223 P.3d 266, 280 (2009)(quoting Nevada v. Us., 463 U.S. 
110,129-30 (1983)). "Res judicata applies even if the priOl'judgment 'may have been wrong or 
rested on a legal principle subsequently ovenuled in another case. '" Knox, 148 Idaho at 338, 223 
P.3d at 280 (quoting Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,398 (1981»). 
The final judgment entered in the 2005 Lawsuit allowing foreclosure and quieting title to 
the Real Property in Indian Springs is res judicata. The Andersens are precluded from 
attempting to re-litigate the issue of foreclosure and title in the present appeal. See Knox, 148 
Idaho at 338,223 P.3d at 280. The district court in the instant case explained: 
The facts of this case are not in significant dispute. Clearly any claim by the 
Andersens ... to the real property ... has been foreclosed. Title to that real 
property has been quieted in Indian Springs. These are determinations previously 
made which are binding on this Court. Any attempts by Defendants to contest the 
title to the real property Calmot be raised again in this matter. 61 
61 R. at 193. 
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Based upon the doctrine of res judicata, the district court properly concluded that Indian Springs 
is the rightful title owner of the Real Property. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED IN FAVOR OF INDIAN SPRINGS 
WITH REGARD TO ITS EJECTMENT CLAIM 
The District Court properly granted Indian Springs' ejectment claim. The elements of a 
claim for ejectment are "(1) ownership [by the plaintiff]; (2) possession by the defendants; and 
(3) refusal of the defendants to sunender the possession." Ada Co. Hwy. Dist. v. Total Success 
Invest., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 232, 332 (2008). The district court in this case 
concluded that the first element concerning ownership was determined in the 2005 Lawsuit as 
discussed above. The district court indicated that the remaining elements were satisfied by "the 
testimony and affidavits presented by the Defendants" themselves.62 Based upon the testimony 
and affidavits presented by the Defendants, the district court found that "Defendants remain in 
possession of real property owned by Indian Springs and refuse to relinquish that possession.,,63 
Notably, the Andersens on appeal have not challenged the district court's findings concerning 
their possession of the real property and their refusal to relinquish that possession. 
62 R. at 192-93 ("While the testimony and affidavits presented by the Defendants herein have 
addressed the requirements of 1. C. § 6-310 ... , the testimony also addressed ownership of the real 
property, the claims of the Defendants to the mobile home, the question of title to the mobile 
home, and every pertinent issue that would be relevant to a claim for ejectment as well.") 
63 R. at 193. 
Notwithstanding, the testimony upon which the district court relied in making these 
findings was offered and admitted during the trial held on October 8, 2009.64 However, the 
Andersens have failed to include a transcript from the trial in the record on appeal and therefore 
have not provided the Supreme Court with the necessary basis for determining whether the 
district court's findings of fact were supported by the evidence. See Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 
929,940,204 P.3d 1140, 1151 (2009). Consequently, the Supreme Comi must presume that the 
district court's factual findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Jd. 
The district court's findings with regard to each element of Indian Springs' ejectment 
claim are suppOlied by the doctrine of res judicata and substantial and competent evidence. No 
error can be presumed due to the lack of an adequate record on appeal. The district comi's 
decision ruling in favor of Indian Springs with regard to its ejectment claim should therefore be 
affirmed on appeal. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE MOBILE HOME 
WAS REAL PROPERTY RATHER THAN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
On page 4 of the Appellants' Brief, the Andersens argue that "[t]he comi ... abused its 
discretion by ruling that the [mobile] home was a permanent fixture - rather than ordering ... 
that the [mobile] home could be moved." This argument is frivolous. 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the situation of a mobile home located upon 
foreclosed property in Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 211 P.3 d 106 (2009). In that case, it 
64 R. at 184-86 (The district court expressly relied upon trial testimony.) 
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was undisputed that real property had been conveyed through a foreclosure under a deed of trust. 
The sole question was whether the mobile home located upon the foreclosed was real property or 
personal property. "A mobile home may be considered either real property or personal propeliy 
under Idaho law." Id. at 501, 211 P.3d at 110. If considered real property, the mobile home is 
conveyed with the land under the foreclosure. Id. If considered personal property, the mobile 
home is not subject to the foreclosure, is not conveyed with the land, and may be removed by its 
owner. Id. 
A mobile home is considered real property if it is "affixed to land" or "appUlienant to 
land." I.e. § 55-101. In considering the mobile home in Spencer, the Supreme Court stated the 
following: 
The evidence demonstrates that the 1981 Skyline mobile home was affixed to the 
land at the time of sale and, therefore, was converted to real property. See I.C. § 
55-101. As set forth in Ed Jameson's affidavit dated November 3, 2006, Spencer 
completed items (a) through (f) in the Agreement related to the mobile home, 
which were: (a) well set-up, with pump, pressure tanks, lines; (b) septic system 
with inspections, and hookup to home; ( c) driveway completion to county 
standards; (d) power lines and pedestal, with inspections and hookup; (e) mobile 
title in file; and (f) foundation, decks, and mobile set-up, including attachment 
and conversion to real property. These tasks and improvements show: (1) the 
mobile home was actually anl1exed to the realty, (2) the mobile home was 
appropriated to the use of that part of the realty to which the home was connected, 
and (3) it was Spencer's intention to make the mobile home a pennanent 
accession to the realty. ... Most persuasively, item (f) specifically required 
"attachment and conversion to real propeliy." Because the 1981 Sky line mobile 
home was affixed to the land at the time of sale, we hold that the mobile home 
was properly transferred to the trustee for purposes of non-judicial foreclosure .... 
Spencer, 147 Idaho at 502, 211 P.3d at 111. Thus, evidence that a mobile home is affixed to a 
permanent foundation, in conjunction with other appUlienances including a deck, a well, a septic 
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system, a driveway, and power hookups, conclusively establishes that the mobile home is "real 
propeliy". !d. 
In the present case, the district cOUli found the following: 
This (sic) facts admitted by Defendants herein are virtually identical to 
Spencer ... In both answers the Defendants admit that the mobile home is 
permanently attached to the land and cmmot be moved. They also assert that the 
mobile home has a garage, storage room, patio walls and a cement floor. 
Andersens assert that the mobile home is a permanent residence with an attached 
garage, patios, a phone, well, septic tank and power pole. The testimony at the 
trial was similar. At no time have Defendants claimed that the mobile [home] 
was anything but pelmanently affixed to the real property. Thus, the COUli 
concludes that the mobile home is real property, pursuant to I.C. § 55-101, that it 
was subject to the prior judgment and foreclosure, and that Indian Springs is the 
owner of the mobile home.65 
On appeal, the Andersens have not challenged any of these factual findings by the District 
Court. Based upon these findings, the Andersens were precluded from removing the mobile 
home or seeking any reimbursement therefore. 
These findings of fact by the district court are fully supported by the admissions made by 
the Andersens in their Answer. 66 They me also fully supported by the evidence admitted at trial. 
However, the Andersens have failed to include a transcript from the trial in the record on appeal 
and therefore have not provided the Supreme Court with the necessary basis for determining 
whether the district cOUli's findings of fact were supported by the evidence. See Danti v. Danti, 
65 R. at 194. 
66 R. at 25 & 29. 
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146 Idaho at 940, 204 P.3d at 1151. Consequently, the Supreme Court must presume that the 
district court's factual findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. Jd. 
The district court's factual findings concerning the character of the mobile home as real 
property are suppolied by substantial and competent evidence as well as the Andersens' 
admissions. No error can be presumed due to the lack of an adequate record on appeal. The 
district court's decision that the mobile home was conveyed to Indian Springs with title to the 
Real Property should therefore be affirmed. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE ANDERSENS' 
COUNTERCLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The Andersens asserted a counterclaim for reimbursement based upon improvements 
they allegedly made to the Real Property before the foreclosure and/or ejectment.67 This 
counterclaim was characterized by the Andersens as a claim for unjust enrichment.68 Indian 
Springs filed a Motion to Dismiss this counterclaim. 69 The district court considered evidence 
outside of the pleadings, applied a summary judgment standard, and granted Indian Springs' 
motion.7o On appeal, the Andersens argue that the district court erred in dismissing this unjust 
67 R. at 252-55. On appeal, the Andersens claim that these improvements are valued at 
$651,000; however, there is no evidence in the record to support such a claim. 
68 R. at 261. 
69 R. at 267-68 & 288-90. 
70 R. at 283,288-90. 
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enrichment counterclaim. 71 This argument is without merit. Dismissal of the Andersens' unjust 
enriclmlent counterclaim is appropriate under a number of alternative legal theories. 
A. The Doctrine of Res Judicata 
The Andersens' unjust enrichment counterclaim seeking reimbursement for alleged 
improvements to the Real Property fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
because it is a counterclaim that could have been, and should have been, raised· in the 2005 
Lawsuit. 72 As stated above, "the doctrine of res judicata provides that when a final judgment has 
been entered on the merits of a case, '[i]t is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, 
concluding pmiies and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered 
and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demmld, but as to any other admissible matter 
which might have been offered for that purpose.'" Knox, 148 Idaho at 338, 223 P.3d at 280 
(quoting Nevada, 463 U.S. at 129-30). 
The 2005 Lawsuit was filed by Indian Springs to collect on a promissory note executed 
by the Andersens and to foreclose on a mortgage identifYing the Real Property as security. 73 In 
that case, a Judgment affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court was entered awarding damages 
against the Andersens in the amount of approximately $300,000.74 Pursuant to the doctrine of 
71 See Appellants' Brief at pp. 18-20. 
72 This argument was raised by Indian Springs in the lower court. See Indian Springs' 
Supplemental Record ("Response to Brief re: Assignor Liability and Memorandum in SuppOli of 
Motion to Dismiss Answer to Verified Amended Complaint and Counterclaim" at pp. 15-16). 
73 Indian Springs LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 215 P.3d 457. 
74 Id. at 743, 215 P.3d at 463. 
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res judicata, any and all counterclaims by the Andersens for damages which would defeat or 
offset that amount - including the Andersens' claimed reimbursement for improvements to the 
Real Property - were required to have been offered and received in the 2005 Lawsuit.75 The 
2005 Lawsuit is res judicata and the Andersens are precluded from now seeking reimbursement 
for improvements in the instant case. 
Consequently, the district court properly dismissed the Andersens' uqjust enriclm1ent 
counterclaim seeking reimbursement for alleged improvements to the Real Property. The district 
cOUli's dismissal of the Andersens' unjust enrichment counterclaim should be affirmed on 
appeal. 
B. All Improvements were Subject to Indian Springs' Mortgage and Judgment 
The Andersens' counterclaim for unjust enrichment seeking reimbursement for 
improvements was extinguished in the 2005 Lawsuit which foreclosed a mortgage on the Real 
Propeliy.76 The general rule regarding improvements upon mortgaged propeliy is stated as 
follows: 
The general rule is that all improvements located on mortgaged realty are covered 
by the mortgage, and as long as such improvements remain intact and may be 
identified, the mOligagee, by proper action, may seize and execute on such 
improvements, wherever located. Moreover, a mortgage of real estate attaches 
to the land, not only in the condition in which it existed at the time of the 
75 See also I.e. § 6-404 (providing that improvement offsets should be addressed in quiet title 
case). 
76 This argument was raised by Indian Springs below. See Indian Springs' Supplemental Record 
("Response to Brief re: Assignor Liability and Memorandum in SuppOli of Motion to Dismiss 
Answer to Verified Amended Complaint and Counterclaim" at pp. 16-18). 
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execution of the mortgage, but as changed and improved by substitutions, 
accretions, or labor expended on it while the mortgage is in existence, except 
for improvements removed by the mortgagor with the consent of the mortgagee. 
In this connection it has been declared that it would be a hazardous doctrine to 
hold that a mOligagee who stands by and sees the propeliy owners care for and 
improve the security does so at the peril of having his or her lien displaced in 
favor of the cost of such care and improvement. 
54A Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 26 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
This general rule is codified in this State. Idaho Code § 45-906 provides that a 
"mortgage is a lien upon everything that would pass by a grant or conveyance of the property." 
(Emphasis added). As discussed above with reference to I.C. § 55-101, the conveyance of real 
property includes the land and all that is "affixed to land" or "appurtenant to land." Thus, all 
affixed and/or appurtenant improvements are subject to the mortgage, regardless of whether they 
came into existence before or afier the execution of the mortgage. See, e.g., Smith v. Sherwood 
& Roberts, Inc., 92 Idaho 248, 255, 441 P.2d 158, 165 (1968)("Generally, that a mortgagee 
receives on foreclosure the benefit of repairs previously done to the mOligaged property does not 
in itself render the mortgagee liable for the value of the repairs.") 
All improvements alleged by the Andersens with regard to their unjust enrichment 
counterclaim are affixed and/or appmienant to the Real Property.77 These claimed improvements 
allegedly include the addition, repairs and upkeep to the swimming pool, concession area, 
driveways, parking areas, bridges, picnic areas, campground, RV hookups, sewer system, and 
77 R. at 252-55. 
30 
78 landscaping. The Andersens admit in paragraph 10 of their Counterclaim that the alleged 
improvements were "permanent improvements. ,,79 Because the Andersens' alleged 
improvements are affixed and/or appurtenant to the Real Propeliy, they were subject to Indian 
Springs' mortgage. In foreclosing its mortgage on the Real Propeliy in the 2005 Lawsuit, Indian 
Springs not only foreclosed upon the land but also upon all improvements to the land. The 
Andersens no longer have any claim to any of the alleged improvements on the Real PropeliY. 
Not only is the law clear on this point, but it is also incorporated into the Judgment issued 
in the 2005 Lawsuit. The district court in the present case described the Judgment from the 2005 
Lawsuit as follows: 
The Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order for Sale was entered by 
Judge Bush on November 19, 2007 and is attached to the Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint as Exhibit A. That Judgment incorporates the Court Memorandum and 
Order dated June 28, 2007 and is also incorporated herein by reference. That 
Judgment forecloses Plaintiff s security interest in the property and provides 
immediate possession of the property "free and clear from any and all claims of 
the above named Defendants [which expressly includes the Andersens] and all 
persons claiming through them, either as purchasers, encumbrancers, or 
otherwise, including their right to possession thereof, which persons shall be 
forever baned, enjoined, and foreclosed of any right, title or interest in said 
11 t . 1· ,,80 co a era , .... 
This Judgment from the 2005 Lawsuit, which was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court, 
forecloses the Andersens from asseliing any fuliher claims in or to the Real Property. However, 
78 1d. 
79 R. at 252. 
80 R. at 183 (fn 2); see also R. at 117-22. 
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that is exactly what the Andersens have done in seeking reimbursement for improvements to the 
Real Property under their unjust emichment counterclaim. 
Based on the law discussed above and the Judgment in the 2005 Lawsuit, the district 
court properly dismissed the Andersens' counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements to the 
Real Propeliy. The district court's dismissal of the Andersens' unjust emichment counterclaim 
should therefore be affirmed on appeal. 
C. All Improvements were Incidental to the Andersens' Pursuit of their Own 
Financial Advantage 
The most thorough description of the Real Property is contained within a real estate flyer 
attached to the Affidavit of Terry Andersen filed October 14, 2009.8 ! The Real Property is 182 
acres and commonly lmown as the "Indian Hot Springs ResOli."S2 It includes a large swimming 
pool filled by hot springs, a campground, 125 RV sites, a picnic area, and an arcade. 83 This is a 
large commercial recreational property.84 The Andersens admit on page 19 of their Appellants' 
Brief that the property consisted of "recreational facilities." On page 14 of their Appellant's 
Brief, the Andersens personally refer to the property as the "Indian Springs Swimming & RV 
Park." 
81 R. at 103-06. 





The Andersens purchased this commercial recreational property in 1996. As part of the 
purchase, they executed a corresponding promissory note and mortgage. 85 Indian Springs 
became the successor in interest to the promissory note and mortgage. 86 In 2005, Indian Springs 
filed a Complaint against the Andersens to collect on the promissory note and to foreclose on the 
mortgage.87 On November 19, 2007, a Judgment was entered awarding damages in the amount 
of almost $300,000 to Indian Springs 88 and quieting title to the property in Indian Springs as 
well.89 The Judgment was affirmed on appeal. 
In their Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, the Andersens allege that they 
made improvements to the Real Property beginning in 1996 when they purchased it and 
extending tlu'ough 2009 after Indian Springs initiated the foreclosure proceedings.90 As 
mentioned above, the Andersens' alleged that they made "permanent improvements" to the 
swimming pool, concession area, driveways, parking areas, bridges, picnic areas, campground, 
RV hookups, sewer system, and landscaping.91 The Andersens claim that Indian Springs has 
been unjustly em-iclled by these improvements and should therefore reimburse the Andersens for 
their value. 
85 Indian Springs LLC, 147 Idaho at 741, 215 P.3d at 461. 
86 Id. 
87Id. 
88 Id. at 743, 215 P.3d at 463. 
89 Id. at 746-49,215 P.3d at 466-69. 
90 R. at 252-55. 
91 Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed similar facts in Heftinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 
467, 886 P.2d 772 (1994). In that case, real property was owned by the Sybrandys. 
Notwithstanding, Hettinga possessed the property and operated it as a diary business. Hettinga 
expanded the dairy operation and made significant improvements to the property to increase its 
net income from the dairy operation. Hettinga filed a lawsuit claiming ownership of the property 
and alternatively asserting an unjust enrichment claim for the improvements he had made to the 
real property. The district court found that Hettinga did not own the property and that he was not 
entitled to any damages under his unjust enriclul1ent claim because the improvements were not 
"intend for the benefit of the Sybrandys" but were instead completed "to increase the income 
generated by the dairy operation." Heftinga, 126 Idaho at 471, 886 P.2d at 776. The Idaho 
Supreme COUli affirmed the finding of the district court, explaining that "[r]ecovery for unjust 
enricml1ent is unavailable if the benefits to the [allegedly enriclled party] were created 
incidentally by [the enriclling party] in pursuit of his own financial advantage." Heftinga, 126 
Idaho 467,471,886 P.2d 772,776 (1994) (citing Brmvn v. Yacht Club of Coeur d' Alene Ltd., 
111 Idaho 195, 199, 722 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Ct. App. 1986)). In such a situation, it is not "unjust" 
for the allegedly enriched paliy to retain the benefit incidentally conferred. Id. 
The Andersens find themselves in a similar position as Hettinga. The Andersens have 
never alleged that any of the improvements were intended at the time of the improvement to 
benefit Indian Springs. Rather, any benefits inuring to the mortgagee (i.e. Indian Springs and its 
predecessor in interest) were created incidentally by the Andersens in pursuit of the Andersens' 
own fmancial advantage with regard to the Swimming & RV Pmk. Indeed, the Andersens admit 
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on page 19 of their Appellants' Brief that the alleged improvements were for "the continued 
operation of the recreational facilities on the property." Therefore, the district court's dismissal 
of the Andersens' unjust enrichment counterclaim should be affirmed on appeal. 
D. The Andersens conferred no Benefit upon Indian Springs which would be 
Unjust to Retain 
An unjust enrichment recovery requires "that the plaintiff confer some benefit on the 
defendant which would be unjust for the defendant to retain." Beco Canst. Co .. Inc. v. Bannock 
Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463,467, 797 P.2d 863, 867 (1990) .. A.n unjust enrichment claim 
must be dismissed if the plaintiff confened no benefit on the defendant. Id. 
In this case, the district court found that Indian Springs did not take possession of the 
property until January 15, 2009 and that there was no evidence that the so-called improvements 
were done after that date while Indian Springs was in possession of the property. 92 
Consequently, the district comi expressly found that the Andersens confened no benefit upon 
Indian Springs which was unjust to retain.93 
These findings of fact by the district court are fully supported by the substantial and 
competent evidence. The district court noted that, in making its decision, it "carefully 
considered the briefs and arguments of the pmiies, as wells as any portion of the prior record 
which is relevant to the pending l110tions.,,94 A significant portion of the prior record consisted 
92 R. at 290. 
93 Id. 
94 R. at 279. 
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of the evidence and testimony submitted at a trial held on October 8, 2009. However, the 
Andersens have failed to include a transcript from the trial in the record on appeal and therefore 
have not provided the Supreme Court with the necessary basis for detennining whether the 
district court's findings of fact were suppOlied by the evidence. See Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 
929,940, 204 P.3d 1140, 1151 (2009). Consequently, the Supreme Court must presume that the 
district cOUli's factual findings were suppOlied by substantial and competent evidence. Id. 
Based upon this presumption, the district court's factual finding that the Andersens conferred no 
benefit upon Indian Springs which was unjust to retain should be affinned on appeal. 
VI. THE ANDERSENS HAVE NOT SHOWN THE DISTRICT JUDGE WAS BIASED 
On page 20 of the Appellants' Brief, the Andersens claim that the district judge may have 
been biased because the district court had acted as the mediator in a different case involving the 
Andersens and because the district cOUli discussed the filing of a Rule 15(b) motion in open 
court. This claim however is frivolous. 
First, this claim is wholly unsupported by any evidence in the record. Second, the 
Andersens make no specific argument as to how the district judge's pmiicipation as a mediator 
or discussion of the Rule 15(b) motion demonstrates any bias. See Schneider v. Schneider, _ 
Idaho _, 258 P.3d 350 *29 (2011). Third, the Andersens failed to raise this issue below and 
thereby have waived the right to raise this issue on appeal. See Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 
68,190 P.3d 876, 887 (2008). 
The Andersens' claim of basis should be rejected on appeal. 
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VII. THE ANDERSENS HAVE WAIVED ANY OTHER CLAIMS ON APPEAL BY 
FAILING TO EITHER LIST THEM AS ISSUES ON APPEAL OR BY FAILING 
TO PRESENT ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY ON THOSE CLAIMS 
In the Conclusion of their Appellants' Brief, the Andersens claim that that they are 
allegedly entitled to damages for loss of personal propeli)', time, money, reputation and storage 
costs. See Appellants' Brief at 22-23. These alleged claims were not listed as issues on appeal. 
Nor were they addressed in the argument section of the Appellants' Brief. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)( 4) requires that the Appellants' Brief contain a "list of the 
issues presented on appeal." "[T]he failure of the appellant to include an issue in the statement 
of issues required by LA.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate the consideration of that issue in the appeal." 
State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959,961, 783 P.2d 298,300 (1989). 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires that the argument portion of the Appellants' Brief 
"contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 
reasons therefore, with citation to authorities, statutes, and parts of the transcript and record 
relied upon." "When issues presented on appeal are not suppOlied by positions of law, citation to 
legal authority, or argument they will not be considered by this Court." HLifJ v. Singleton, 143 
Idaho 498, 500, 148 PJd 1244, 1247 (2006). This statement of law is unchanged even if the 
issue is listed as an issue on appeal and it is mentioned in the Conclusion of the Appellants' 
Brief. Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497,502-03,927 P.2d 887, 892-93 (1996). 
The list of issues in the Appellants' Brief at page 15 does not identifY damages for loss of 
personal property, time, money, reputation and storage costs as issues on appeal. The argument 
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section of the Appellants' Brief also fails to address these claims. Therefore, these claims should 
not be considered on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the Judgment of the district 
court in favor of Indian Springs be affirmed in its entirety and that Indian Springs be granted its 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this ~ day of October, 2011. 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
s~ ~ 
Attorneys for Respondent Indian Springs, LLC. 
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